В этом номере мы впервые за восьмилетнюю историю "Панорамы" решили напечатать в ней текст на английском языке. А по-другому с ним и не поступишь. Переведи его на русский - и пропадет из виду самое интересное: попытка дать определение сепульки (khoziaistvennik) без отсылки к сепулькарию и сепулятору.
Это отрывок из работы профессора университета им.Гумбольдта в Берлине Михаэля Бри "The Political Regime of Moscow - Creation of a New Urban Machine", опубликованной по-английски в Wissenshcaftszentrum Berlin fur Socialforschung papers (номер P 97-002).
Центральный термин этой работы - Urban Machine - придуман в начале века для характеристики локального политического режима, при котором правящая политическая организация (пусть даже неформальная) обеспечивает себе безоблачное переизбрание на новые и новые сроки на демократических выборах и стабильность в межвыборных промежутках путем развития системы массового патронажа.
"The lasting power of urban machines lies in their ability to transform larger parts of the electorate into groups of mass patronage and form a clientellistic power bloc with decisive factions of the economic elite. Universal suffrage is not used as a system to elect representatives for the "common good" of the city around programmatic cleavages, but as a mechanism to keep patrons in power to care for the much more particularistic interests of a fragmented electorate and to supply it with divisible material benefits. The municipal budget is spent on binding economic elites, bonding core groups of the urban machines - the functionaries and some crucial parts of the electorate - and committing others by delivering some less expensive "club" of private goods. Beyond these features of urban machine politics, in order to stabilize the self-perpetuating mechanism of power holding its proponents have also generated such common strategies as a centralistic organization, the personalization of power (the role of the boss), and stressing the importance of informal as opposed to formal interaction."
Urban machine, по мнению автора, появляется при стечении трех факторов: зависимого положения основных социальных групп (в том числе представителей бизнеса) в контексте модернизации; зависимости местных элит от поддержки избирателей на демократических выборах; способности местных элит скооперироваться с бизнес-элитой и общегосударственной элитой для блокирования любых альтернатив и сохранения своей монополии на осуществление массового патронажа.
Для начала автор сравнивает две классических описанных в литературе разновидности Urban Machine - североамериканскую (например, Нью-Йорк) и южноитальянскую (например, Палермо). Американская машина больше напоминает сеть, участники которой - патронируемые группы населения, национальная элита, большой и малый бизнес, оргпреступность - взаимодействуют друг с другом в том числе и без посредничества босса и муниципальных функционеров. Итальянская - выстроена по принципу жесткой иерархии, в которой все процессы замкнуты на местную власть во главе с патроном.
В схеме, начерченной М.Бри для Москвы, место американских и итальянских "патронируемых групп" занимает один большой электорат, объединенный неадресным (impersonal) патронажем. А вместо "федеральной элиты" нарисовано множество квадратиков под названием "group of federal elite", разбросанных по разным углам.
Публикуемая глава (4.5) именуется "Мэр как ХОЗЯИН - идеология патронажа и управления реформами". Мы печатаем ее без сокращений и даже с некоторыми удлиннениями, а именно с подробной расшифровкой некоторых библиографических ссылок. Иногда заголовки книг, названия стран, фигурирующих в этих заголовках, а также даты издания очень хорошо показывают, какие ассоциации возникают у зарубежных исследователей при столкновении с нашей современной действительностью.
The Mayor as the Khoziain -The Ideology of Patrimonial Powerand Reform Management
For power to be stable, three conditions have to be met - it must be legitimate, able to buy loyalty, and be based on force. Legitimacy is by far both the cheapest and most important source of power and institutional effectiveness, but difficult to get and to keep. In face of demise of the communist ideology, the reformers and "democrats" tried to build up a radical anti-Communist legitimacy by orienting themselves towards marketization and liberalization. This legitimacy proved strong for some time, only to start fading away after 1992. As a functional political movement in terms of mobilizing and directing social actors against the Soviet system and promising them quick results, it lacked some basic features needed for a long-term transformation ideology, namely (1) a positive system of values embodied in day-to-day life both in terms of continuity with the past and novelty, (2) a kind of bonding effect between the immediate winners and losers of transformation, (3) a focus on the demands of the people, a center symbolizing trustworthiness, stability and progressive change. The ideological potential inherent in a simple rejection of the Soviet past, the appeal for patience in waiting for the fruits of the transformation to spread to the majority of the population which in the meantime was without any assistance, and the reference to some impersonal macroeconomic principles difficult to understand was quickly exhausted. The people started looking for a new kind of leadership which would take responsibility for their substantial problems and one which differed from both the former communist nomenklatura and the "democrats" and "liberals" of 1991 [Kliamkin, 1994].
It is worth taking a closer look at the alternative ideology Luzhkov formed from the very beginning. Its starting point was the term khoziaistvennik and its cornerstone became the term khoziain. To understand it we have to go back in Soviet history. Luzhkov belongs to a generation fundamentally different from the generation of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, even though only five years set them apart from one another. But these years were crucial. Gorbachev and Yeltsin were born in 1931. The decisive period in which their basic philosophy of life was formed was the time of the late Stalin and the thaw immediately after, a time of great hope and quick changes, a time of ideology and a common enemy - the Stalinist system of repression. Gorbachev ended up starting a system transformation as the "last true Lenin believer" [Hanson, 1991] and Yeltsin was able to end this transformation as the leader of the radical democratic movement. Luzhkov, by contrast, belonged to the early post-Stalinist generation [Nagle, 1977]. He became a member of the specialist elite and until 1986 had remained a pure technician (for these classifications see M.C.Lodge, Soviet Elite Attitudes Since Stalin. 1969 and G.Fischer, The Soviet System and Modern Society. 1968) working for an extended period in the Ministry of Chemistry and as the director general of a large chemical corporation. He never became a party "apparatchik".
Luzhkov formulated his attitude toward social change in a pointed "non-ideological" - or, to be more precise, in a managerial - fashion, looking for concrete workable solutions to concrete problems: "God has not made a dissident of me. If I see the weak spots of a system, I want to repair them, not to expose them. I'm only interested in criticism if it contains within it seeds for reform" [Luzhkov, 'My deti tvoi, Moskva']. He stresses the differences between leaders-ideologists ("who know what to do all the time") and leaders-khoziaistvenniks (understanding, that there are situations, "where you can't do anything and at the same time you can't leave things as they are") (ibid.). For those of the former persuation, politics aims at on overriding ideological construction of a new, totally different society, whatever the costs may be (T.H.Rigby, Stalinism and the Mono-Organizational Society, 1997). For those of the latter persuasion, politics is a technical process of achieving pragmatical solutions one can live with in the most efficient way possible.
It is difficult to translate the term khoziaistvennik because it emerged within a very specific Soviet context. It implied a managerial orientation toward economics, without the problems of a market. From this perspective, the economy was viewed as a purely technical problem with a few social implications - a khoziaistvennik had to solve concrete technical problems with the people put under his supervision. This implied a distancing by the managers from both party leadership and its claim of general responsibility for the whole system.
Within the context of transition and as head of the city administration, Luzhkov began changing what was implied by the term khoziaistvennik. Describing the period of democratization, he distinguishes three types of new representatives of the Moscow Soviet - the first group, the majority, consisting of people trying to destroy the old system without much concern for the results, a second group of people interested only in personal gain, and a very small group like himself he describes as real democrats with "a deeper understanding of the democratic conception of governance". It would be worthwhile to take a closer look at this "democratic" understanding which legitimated the increasing role of the executive branch of government and was the source of the decline of the role of the Soviet. Luzhkov writes: "I have in mind the idea that it isn't necessary to rule over the city, that at the top of the city government you do not have to have a man who will decide for everybody what is right and what is wrong, but a man who wants to serve the people, who sees his function as part of the municipal service. According to this perspective, the municipal administration is in reality transformed into a managerial task (khoziaistvennaya zadacha). This is the reason for strengthening the executive branch of power" [Luzhkov, 'My deti tvoi, Moskva']. This is how the introduction of the function of a mayor, directly elected by the inhabitants, is legitimized. The former khoziaistvennik becomes a "servant", and the "first" servant becomes the elected head of government. Nor is this the end of the transition, What follows is the transition of the mayor as a servant into the mayor as the khoziain.
The term khoziain is one of the most important in the Russian tradition. It is closely connected to the ancient term oikos, meaning the large household of an authoritarian master, very different from the modern term economy. In the Russian language the term has at least six different meanings: (1) the owner of something, (2) the master, (3) the man in charge of the household (oikos), (4) the employer of paid labor, (5) the head of a household and (6) the husband (Ozhegov, 1987). In the special jargon of the Russian underground, the term is used to imply (1) the head of a penal colony, the Gulag, (2) the man in charge of a hideout, (3) the head of a gang (4), the Gulag itself. Stalin was named the Big Khoziain [Slovar' tiuremno-lagerno-blatnogo zhargona. 1992].
Luzhkov's use of the term khoziain is a reflection of its ambivalence. On the one hand, he refers to its authoritarian tradition and celebrates the liberal idea of an autonomous citizen accountable for him/herself as being a real objective of the transition: "... you cannot forget that our state has a history not of 70 years, but of more than one thousand. And all this time with nothing more then a few small interruptions, Russia was in reality the property of the man - the khoziain of the country. His commonly acknowledged duty was to care for the good of his subjects like a father... But such a khoziain wasn't interested in the problem that everybody has his own ideas about what is good for him... Unfortunately, many still place their hope in good leadership..." [Luzhkov, 'Egoizm vlasti'].
The liberal critique of the tradition of a khoziain is only one side of the story. The other is even more significant. In a very personal manner he wrote about a special "spirit of Moscow", "paradoxically combining the power and magnitude of one of the largest metropolises of the world in an astonishing patriarchal and domestic fashion which hasn't vanished but become even stronger in the last years" [Luzhkov, 'My deti tvoi, Moskva']. For Luzhkov, informality and the lack of intermediary institutions - a special kind of direct accessibility (korotkost) - are elements of a distinct Moscow culture and have been instrumental in helping him to achieve his vision of a khoziain: "This special kind of direct accessibility in relations pertains to both the inhabitants and the leaders If the mayor is personally responsible for all that is going on in the city, then he isn't the formal head of the executive branch of power, but a khoziain. He has to have a personal, almost domestic interest in each problem, in every centimeter of the city territory, in each pothole" [ibid]. In the same context, Luzhkov places the tradition of the khoziain with its patriarchal strain opposite "the Western idea of formalization imported by Peter the Great from Europe". The "special 'khoziaiskii' type of governance" implies "to directly choose the task and then, with every means at one's disposal, without any regard for hierarchies and procedures, accomplish it"
Proclaiming a liberal "self-regulating" society as the objective of the transition, under the current conditions Luzhkov made acceptable the role of such a 'khoziaiskii' type of governance by referring to its necessary and transitional character in light of the actual situation: "I don't want to idealize this method of governance. It is a forced and transitional one and I would like to do all I can to organize things in such a way that we won't be required to use it. But even today Moscow as the capital represents the Russian spirit, all the time moving towards being on the verge of shapelessness. This means that if it is possible to implement a timely solution, we will get more than just results. We will pass from the detested existence between stagnation and anarchy to a quiet and stable dynamic development ".
Luzhkov's understanding of a khoziain is not nearly as traditionalistic as it would appear to be. What he is trying to do is reformulate traditional Russian and Soviet values, habits and practices into a highly dynamic conception of transitional political management. The policy goal of the Moscow government is an active political creation of both a market infrastructure and market actors. Criticizing the top reformers he wrote: "A civilized economy isn't the result of spontaneous growth. It is created by detailed work, by the regulation of its mechanisms with regard to the concrete conditions, the special local environment, and the habits of the people. It does not shoot up like weeds on fallow land. A system is a kind of living organism. In order to instill it with spirit you have to work like God in the days of Genesis".
The understanding of reform management by a khoziain is very much like the role of God in the philosophy of Leibniz - first God created a perfect mechanism and then withdrew himself from it. It consciously renews the tradition of an enlightened government of the XVIIth century. Referring to his predecessor and with himself in mind, he wrote: "For the businessmen he (Popov - M.B.) represented a man of strong ideas. After talking with him, the ordinary activity of making money was transformed into a holy case of working for progress and order. He represented ideals, sometimes forgotten in the developed countries - ideas of a great thinker living in the age of primary accumulation, the spirit which foreigners are sensing today in Russia."
The mayor as a khoziain differs greatly from a German burgermeister. The idea of a mayor being personally responsible for the individual welfare of the citizens, having the right to change the political and economic system according to his own ideas irregardless of written laws and norms, having political power concentrated in his hands uncontrolled by a legislature and legal system, and handling the city as one enterprise, such characteristics as found within the Russian context are unique. As is often the case, this understanding of khoziain integrates very different and even contradictory elements - traditional and modern, authoritarian and democratic, social, liberal and conservative, Russian and Western, all the while stressing social security and equality and aiming at a meritocratic stratification of society. It represents the hopes of divergent parts of the population and promises solutions to their specific problems. It is able to legitimize power in the eyes not only of the winners, but also the losers, not only of reform oriented, but also very conservative groups. And this seems to be its greatest ideological strength.
The image of Luzhkov, partially created by himself and his political machine, partially a reflection of the public search for alternatives, and partially a typical kind of mass media construct, id proof of his ability to symbolize the aforementioned contradictory expectations. As the leading Moscow newspaper Nezavisimaya gazeta wrote during a time of open struggle between Luzhkov and some groups within the presidential administration: "Now the mass media is creating a new populist image of Luzhkov as a national leader. He is a professional and an outstanding manager (khoziaistvennik), a charismatic leader who is able to overpower organized crime, an advocate of national industrial and trade interests, a leader of big business and the 'new Russian' businessmen. He is a champion of social justice and defends the pensioners and the low-income groups; he is a generous patron of culture and the church, and a Russian patriot capable of developing civilized relations with the West ...".
Legitimizing the reign of a khoziain directly elected by the people, Luzhkov formulates the basic principles of a special political regime which we will refer to as a reform-oriented "patrimonial democracy". Such a regime combines three features: (1) patrimonialism as a kind of political power principally organized in the same way as the personal power over an oikos [M.Weber, "Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. 1976], (2) the minimal democratic requisite of universal suffrage, and (3) a historical legitimation as a regime strongly oriented towards state-controlled market reforms. The personal power of a khoziain is legitimized both by a democratic procedure, repeated from time to time, and by a permanent substantial role as the head of such an "enlarged" household.
The system seems quite perfect, but it is indeed a sharp deviation from the democratic ideal of the late perestroika and its popular movement. It renews the famous social contract of the Brezhnev era [L.Cook, 1992], adding some democratic elements and a new kind of economy - state capitalism instead of state socialism. As Andrei Fadin notes: "Luzhkov is without a doubt very effective, and in his opinion effectiveness is the most important political value. But for him effective governance and democracy (as a procedure and a system, growing from the bottom up) are indeed located at opposite poles. Addressing the deputies of the Supreme Soviet he formulated his understanding of democracy with the following brilliant statement: "You cannot replace me. I'm elected by the inhabitants of Moscow. But, once 'elected', do not interfere in the job! ..." Besides, the inhabitants of Moscow don't seem particularly bothered: life in Moscow is indeed much better than in Russia as a whole. An exchange of direct political rights for patronage was carried out".
The decisive role of elections for the occupation of the top position at the regional level, the lasting fragility of the regime itself, the rapid and total socioeconomic change and the secular character of the political competition explain to a large extent the strong distributive pressure of elections [J.Scott. Patron-Client politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia. 1977]. The former dependency of the late-Soviet nomenklatura on the passive loyalty of the population was reestablished by the dependency of the new elites on the votes of their subjects. The population could use their democratic right to vote as a "hard currency" to buy some kind of party patronage [A.Wiengrod. Patrons, Patronage and Political Parties. 1977]. In order to be stable, the "orthodox" political machine of Luzhkov has to be fed by impressive election results. Therefore, it has to deliver social protection to the majority and a new modern metropolitan infrastructure to the winners of the transition.
After 1993 when old trade unions changed their strategy toward reforms from confrontation to one of selective cooperation and started to look for allies, Luzhkov became a supporter of a corporatist strategy. It was the Moscow branch of the FNPR (Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia) which nominated him to run for mayor of Moscow in 1996. In April, 1997, Luzhkov was one of the key speakers at a conference on "The Role of Social Partnership in Socio-Economic Development and the Regulation of Labor Relations". He argued in favor of a strong corporatist model and defended the role of the trade unions as an important partner not only at the federal ar regional levels, but also at the enterprise level. He is one of the few regional leaders who carefully monitors whether or not decisions made by the regional tripartite commission are implemented. In Luzhkov's future political campaigns, it would appear that he would be able to make better use of the experienced and influential Russian-wide trade unions than on the weak political parties [A.Zhelenin. Moskovskii mer i profsoiuzy. NG, 8 May 1997]. Reform-oriented "patrimonial democracies" just like American or southern Italian urban machine regimes are part of a broader tendency towards a "delegative democracy", where an elected president is authorized to govern, "as he or she sees fit, constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of office" [G.O'Donnel, 1994]. The low level of formal institutionalization of such political regimes is compensated by strong informal vertical and horizontal networks and personal rule [G.O'Donnel, 1996]. Both are justified by the "functional necessities" and the need for mass patronage during a transitional period.
The concept of the khoziain contains some of the features of American urban machine bossism and the southern Italian transformation of a party into a successor of notables. But there are also striking differences. The boss of an American urban machine is a political businessman, a kind of political merchant as Steffens called him in his famous book "The Shame of the Cities", first published in 1904. He was "a businessman whose chief stock trade was the goods of the political world - influence, laws, government grants and franchises - which he utilized to make a private profit" [J.Tarr. The Urban Politician as Entrepreneur. 1984]. In contrast to this role of the American boss as a political businessmen, the southern Italian party bosses played the role of the traditional notables under conditions in which a strong central state and a mass party existed. They transformed the party apparatus into a personal fiefdom for the sake of political power [J.Chubb. Patronage, Power and Poverty in Southern Italy. 1982]. They became modern political patrons and not political businessmen. The mayor of Moscow as a khoziain differs both from the American boss and the southern Italian patron. He is the head of a state enterprise whose aim is the modernization of society from above through the creation of a market infrastructure framework and the provision of a security net for the poorer parts of the population. This concept of political power combines the features of an effective manager and a good czar.
* * *
Интересными и даже несколько неожиданными (на фоне того, что постоянно пишут "здесь") выглядят перспективы политического режима в Москве, какими их излагает в последней главе своего исследования М.Бри.
Напоминая об условиях, необходимых для зарождения и существования urban machine, и особенно о третьем - поддержке общенациональной элиты и крупного бизнеса - автор задается вопросом - а будет ли нужен такой режим крупным корпорациям, когда они встанут на ноги и смогут заниматься социальным патронажем сами? И будет ли он нужен федеральным властям, которых вполне может устроить более простой способ управления столичным округом - через назначаемого Президентом наместника?
Московский режим, в отличие от итальянского и американского аналогов, опирается не на партию, а непосредственно на государственный аппарат. "By diminishing political life and the short traditions of democratic movements, and by concentrating politics in the state alone, the Luzhkov government undermines its own political base. Through the weakening of its dependency of the electorate, the dependency on the federal leadership is strengthened. Without strong popular pressure for a democratic self-government of Moscow, in times of need the government of Moscow can be replaced by the Russian President. Without any political mobilization from the bottom up, the system of appointment of the Moscow government by federal authorities can easily be reestablished."
Возможный повод и срок для такого рода реформы - будущая президентская кампания. Прямое участие московских государственных (за отсутствием партийных) структур в федеральной борьбе элит может побудить нового президента сделать Москву своим "прямым доменом" или (особенно если этим президентом станет сам Лужков) "избрать" менее самостоятельного мэра. It would be ironic, - пишет М.Бри, - were the end of the Luzhkov regime in Moscow to coincide with the spread and stabilization of machine politics in the majority of the Russian regions.